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Abstract 
 
We estimate the relationship between investment and unemployment over the time period 
1960-2015 in 20 OECD countries. While neoclassical growth theory typically assumes full 
employment – with no effect of investment on unemployment – we find that over our sample 
period covering more than five decades, a statistically significant negative relationship does 
exist: when investment fell, unemployment increased. When the time period is broken down 
into two sub-periods to take account of the Great Recession, we find that the estimated 
coefficient of investment is slightly smaller when the period 2001-2015 is added to the 1960-
2000 period. We also find a positive effect of the current account surplus on unemployment 
that very likely works through investment. A non-monetary model shows how an increase in 
policy uncertainty that sharply contracts investment and raises unemployment can lead to an 
increase in current account surplus. 
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With the 1936 publication of John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money and John Hicks’ 1937 article entitled “Mr. Keynes and the `Classics’: A 
suggested interpretation,” which developed the ISLM model, effective demand was given a 
central role in determining aggregate employment. An increase in investment, in boosting 
effective demand, would expand employment and reduce unemployment. The negative 
relationship between investment and unemployment should prevail only in the short run. 
Over the long run, the neoclassical model of growth starting with Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956) predicts that a higher rate of investment raises per capita output but has no effect on 
unemployment.1 Spurred by the steady rise of unemployment in Europe from the early 1980s 
without disinflation, models were developed such as Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and 
Phelps (1994) that identified forces that could shift the path of the natural rate of 
unemployment. In these models of the medium run, economic forces that lead to an 
investment boom typically also shifts down the whole path of the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. 
    The theory summarised above predicts that a negative relationship between investment and 
unemployment should prevail only in the short run (say, over several quarters) to the medium 
run (say, over two to three decades).2 The objective of this paper is to empirically assess 
whether this relationship holds over the long run (say, over half a century). We find that, 
empirically, the relationship indeed holds even over the long run. A statistically significant 
negative relationship exists between investment and unemployment over the time period 
1960-2015 in a sample of 20 OECD countries. As the period includes the last decade of a 
financial crisis and the Great Recession, which some regard as a departure from normal 
economic fluctuations, we also conduct our empirical analysis by breaking down the whole 
period into two sub-periods: 2001-2015 and 1960-2000. We find that the estimated 
coefficient of investment is slightly smaller when the period 2001-2015 is added to the 1960-
2000 period. Given our focus on investment, we also examine whether, empirically, it is 
through investment that the positive relationship between current account surpluses and 
unemployment, recently discovered by Bertola (2017), works. We find that this is, indeed, the 
case. We then spell out a theoretical model that is compatible with our empirical findings. 
 
                                                          
1 In the standard formulation, full employment is assumed in neoclassical growth models. 
2 Modigliani (2000) first noted a medium-term relationship between investment and unemployment without 
formal testing (see also Blanchard, 2000). The relationship was formally estimated by Herbertsson and Zoega 
(2002) using data from 1960 to 1997 and found to be statistically significant and robust. 
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    While the formal development of neoclassical growth theory has abstracted from 
unemployment, Professor Robert Solow in his Nobel lecture (1987) argued for the need to 
integrate unemployment into long-run growth models. He says, “[I]f one looks at substantial 
more-than-quarterly departures from equilibrium growth, as suggested, for instance, by the 
history of the large European economies since 1979, it is impossible to believe that the 
equilibrium growth path itself is unaffected by the short- to medium-run experience. In 
particular, the amount and direction of capital formation are bound to be affected by the 
business cycle, whether through gross investment in new equipment or through the 
accelerated scrapping of old equipment. … So a simultaneous analysis of trend and 
fluctuations really does involve an integration of the long run and the short run, of 
equilibrium and disequilibrium.” Non-monetary medium-run models of structural slumps, 
such as those described in Phelps (1994), were developed with a view to understanding 
economic fluctuations over a couple of decades and provide to a degree an integration of 
unemployment theory and growth theory. Our empirical finding of a negative relationship 
between investment and unemployment over half a century suggests that this class of models, 
particularly when physical capital is incorporated, has explanatory power even over the long 
run.      
We start in Section 1 by surveying the literature on mechanisms behind medium-term 
movements in unemployment and the investment-unemployment relationship before 
conducting our empirical analysis in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4, we spell out a non-
monetary model of the natural rate of unemployment that is compatible with the empirical 
patterns found in the data. Concluding remarks are in Section 5. 
  
1. A brief overview of the literature 
One of the objectives of this paper is to explore to what extent the medium-term negative 
relationship between investment and unemployment survived the Great Recession at the 
beginning of the 21th century. By covering a whole time period that is more than half a 
century long, we seek to empirically test whether the relationship exists also in the long run. 
We will first survey a host of models that predict a close relationship between investment and 
unemployment. Then, we survey the literature on how the Great Recession that followed the 
financial crisis of 2008 may have affected investment and unemployment as well as the 
relationship between the two. 
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1.1 Models of investment and unemployment in the medium run  
When observing unemployment over long periods of time in developed economies, it 
becomes apparent that its long swings dominate shorter business cycle fluctuations. In many 
countries, the 1950s and 1960s were a period of low unemployment, the 1970s and 1980s 
were a period of rising unemployment, and the unemployment patterns in the 1990s were 
more diverse. The first decade of this century then saw unemployment initially falling in 
many countries and then rising rapidly in the Great Recession.  
 There is a large literature that explains differences across countries and over time in 
unemployment by differences in institutions and changes in institutions across countries. The 
paper by Nickell, et al. (2005) is a good example of this approach.3 Here, unemployment is 
related to labour market institutions such as the level and duration of unemployment benefits, 
the size and centralisation of labour unions and taxes on labour, in addition to several 
macroeconomic shocks such as changes in oil prices and the real rate of interest.  
 There are also papers that model the relationship between various macroeconomic 
variables and unemployment. The employment decision has an investment dimension in 
many of these models. Thus, changes in the rate of productivity growth affect firms’ 
investment in vacancies (Pissarides, 2001) as well as the training of workers (Phelps, 1994; 
Hoon and Phelps, 1997; and Salop, 1979); higher stock prices imply expectations of 
increased future profits and a higher value of trained workers making firms decide to increase 
training investment (Phelps and Zoega, 2001); and higher start-up costs reduce firm creation 
and employment (Pissarides, 2002), while higher oil prices may increase markups and hence 
lower the real demand wage causing increased unemployment (Carruth et al., 1998). In some 
papers, such as Nickell, et al. (2005), Phelps (1994), Fitoussi, et al. (2000) and Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000), the two approaches are combined so that the effect of the macroeconomic 
shocks depends on the labour market institutions. 
 There is a more recent literature that explores the experience of the Great Recession of 
2008-2009. Hoffman and Lemieux (2016) find that the larger employment swings in the 
United States than in Canada and Germany can be attributed to the larger employment swings 
in the construction sector linked to the housing bubble in the United States. Bertola (2017) 
describes the role of international capital mobility in generating labour market shocks that 
can account for differences in the evolution of unemployment within Europe. He proposes a 
                                                          
3 See also Layard, et al. (2005) and its first edition published in 1991. 
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model where production is affected by the investment of foreigners in the domestic capital 
stock. Thus capital inflows increase labour demand through increased investment in physical 
capital and lower the rate of unemployment. The capital inflow countries – such as Ireland 
and Spain – experienced falling unemployment before the onset of the crisis for this reason. 
When the ratio of current account deficits to GDP is inserted into the empirical equation of 
Blanchard-Wolfers (2000), it turns out to be very statistically significant with a negative 
coefficient so that the current-account deficit countries – that is, the ones having capital 
inflows – have lower unemployment.4  
 A negative relationship between investment and unemployment arises in many of the 
papers mentioned above because hiring new workers often involves an investment decision. 
As discussed in Phelps (1994), firms can invest both in the training of new workers and in 
new customers in addition to physical capital. In all these cases, the real demand wage may 
be affected and hence also the natural rate of unemployment in the presence of real wage 
rigidity. 
 In Phelps (1992, 1994), the customer market model of Phelps and Winter (1970) is used to 
explain changes in the natural rate of unemployment. The expectation of higher productivity 
in the future makes firms want to increase their current market share by cutting markups 
since, although this leads to lower current profits, they can expect future profits to increase by 
more. Hence the price cutting is an investment in gaining future market share. Of course, in 
the representative agent model, no one gains market share in general equilibrium but markups 
end up smaller, prices fall, and the real demand wage increases resulting in a fall of the 
natural rate of unemployment. Conversely, the expectations of a fall in productivity would 
lead to an increase in markups and a fall in the real demand wage, and the natural rate of 
unemployment goes up. Changes in interest rates also have an effect on the investment in the 
market share such that an increase of interest rates will lead to a fall in the shadow price of 
new customers, higher markups, and a lower real demand wage; thus the natural rate of 
unemployment will rise.  
    In Hoon and Phelps (1992) and Phelps (1994), firms invest in the training of new workers 
and increase the number of workers being trained until the marginal cost of training a new 
worker equals his shadow price. The shadow price depends on the interest rate and future 
productivity such that higher interest rates and lower expected productivity would make firms 
                                                          
4 When the current account is omitted, Bertola (2017) finds that labour market reforms cannot account for the 
variation in unemployment when recent years are added. Moreover, the same applies to the interaction of time-
varying institutions and macroeconomic shocks so that many of the statistically significant coefficients in the 
Blanchard-Wolfers (2000) model drop out. 
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train fewer workers and raise the natural rate of unemployment. These models explain the 
level or stock of unemployment. There are also models that explain the flow of workers 
yielding equilibrium unemployment in the labour market. In these models the posting of new 
vacancies can have an investment component. In a matching model with search frictions, 
Pissarides (2001) shows how firms invest in the creation of new vacancies and the level of 
investment depends on the expected present discounted value of a newly hired worker. Thus 
the expectation of higher productivity would make firms invest in more vacancies generating 
a flow from unemployment to employment and similarly higher interest rates would reduce 
the shadow price of a worker leading firms to cut down on the number of job vacancies hence 
raising the equilibrium level of unemployment.  
 The empirical relationship that we are exploring in this paper is between investment in 
physical capital and unemployment. Although one can expect the shadow price of different 
assets – customers, trained workers, and physical capital – to be related we will emphasise a 
model where changes in investment in physical capital and unemployment are related. 
Investment in physical capital and unemployment are most directly related in the medium 
term in the two-sector model of Kanaginis and Phelps (1994) and Phelps (1994), which are 
based on Uzawa (1961). Here, there are two sectors, one producing a consumer good and the 
other producing a capital good. The consumer-goods sector uses capital intensively while the 
capital-goods sector uses only labour. It follows that a rise in the relative price of the capital 
good increases the real demand wage and employment when real wages are rigid. An 
increase in the real rate of interest or a fall in expected productivity will make demand for the 
consumer good fall, which translates into a fall in the demand for the output of the labour-
intensive capital goods sector. This causes the real demand wage to fall and the natural rate of 
unemployment to increase. 
  
1.2 The effects of the Great Recession 
The Great Recession that followed the financial crisis of 2008 may have affected investment 
and unemployment as well as the relationship between the two. Increased uncertainty can 
affect the risk premium faced by different countries. In addition, there is the effect of 
increased uncertainty on investment and employment when hiring involves an investment 
decision that goes back to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) who explained how the value of the 
investment option increases with uncertainty, hence increasing the cost of investing. Baker, 
Bloom and Davis (2016) measure uncertainty by developing an index of economic policy 
uncertainty based on newspaper coverage frequency and find, using firm-level data, that 
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increased policy uncertainty is associated with greater stock price volatility and reduced 
investment and employment in sectors that rely heavily on policy such as defence, health 
care, construction and finance. Hence increased policy uncertainty tends to precede declines 
in investment and employment in the United States and also in a sample of 12 large 
economies. Gulen and Ion (2015) use the index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) to 
estimate the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate investment. They find evidence for a 
negative relationship between policy uncertainty and investment such that a doubling in the 
level of policy uncertainty is associated with an average decrease in quarterly investment 
rates of close to 9% relative to the average investment rate in the sample. Gilchrist et al. 
(2014) provide a complementary explanation for the effect of uncertainty on investment to 
that of Dixit and Pindyck. They show using both macro and micro evidence how fluctuations 
in idiosyncratic uncertainty affect investment through changes in credit spreads. They 
compare empirically the two effects – the value of waiting and the changing credit spreads – 
on investment and find that both types of shocks exert a strong effect on investment by 
generating countercyclical credit spreads and procyclical leverage, which fits the data well. 
Banerjee, et al. (2015) attribute the weak investment in the world economy in the aftermath 
of the Great Recession to uncertainty about the future state of the economy and expected 
profits rather than financing conditions. Bordo and Haubrich (2016) also attribute the slow 
recovery from the crisis to policy uncertainty. Caldara, et al. (2016) explore the 
macroeconomic development around the Great Recession and find that both financial shocks 
and uncertainty shocks are important macroeconomic disturbances, especially when the 
uncertainty shocks coincide with a tightening of financial conditions. 
There is the question whether uncertainty could be expected to affect investment and 
unemployment differently. In an interesting recent paper, Kim and Kung (2016) show how 
the ease with which an asset can be sold, what they call redeployability, affects the response 
of investment to increased uncertainty. Thus firms are more cautious when it comes to 
investing in assets that are less redeployable in the face of uncertainty because of their lower 
liquidation values. This intuition has direct relevance for our study because the firing of 
workers involves costs in the form of lost training and human capital as well as redundancy 
pay in many cases while productive capital can be discarded or sold in the second-hand 
market. The redeployability of the two assets may hence not be the same and uncertainty 
affects investment in capital and new workers differently, depending on which model of the 
labour market we have chosen. This applies particularly to the turnover-training model of 
Hoon and Phelps (1992). It follows that either investment or unemployment may have 
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responded more to the increased uncertainty during the Financial Crisis hence affecting the 
strength of the relationship between the two. 
In a recent paper, Hall (2017) put forward an alternative explanation for how recessions 
can affect unemployment through investment.  In his model the stock market and all types of 
investment fall in a recession, including investment by firms in job creation. In essence, the 
discount rate implicit in determining the stock market value goes up and the discount rate 
applied to other claims on future business income also rises during a recession. In particular, 
this generates a lower present value of future profits an employer attributes to a new hire. In 
the Pissarides-Diamond model, this reduces the rate of job creation, the labour market 
slackens, and unemployment goes up. Thus high discount rates, low investment level, and 
high unemployment go together.  
       We now turn to establish the stylised facts found in the data, in particular to estimate the 
relationship between investment and unemployment and to explore whether it changed during 
the Great Recession and its aftermath, paying particular attention to the relationship with the 
current account balance. In the penultimate section of the paper, we will then spell out a 
theoretical model of equilibrium unemployment that fits the stylised facts. 
 
2. Shocks identified 
We start by measuring the long swings of unemployment and investment using principal 
component analysis. In an earlier paper by one of us (Smith and Zoega, 2007), we showed 
how the first principal component (PC) of an unemployment matrix with 21 countries and 42 
years of observations could explain 69% of the variation in the matrix and capture the global 
changes in unemployment over time.  
 We have unemployment data for 20 countries from 1960-2015 and investment data (gross 
capital formation as a share of GDP) for a sample of countries from 1970-2015. We take the 
standardised 56*20 matrix of unemployment rates (U) and the 46*20 matrix of investment (I) 
and construct their variance-covariance matrices, U’U and I’I, and diagonalise the matrices in 
the following way  
21 '''' Φ=Φ= IBIBUAUA  
where A and B are the matrices of orthogonal eigenvectors and Φ  is the (20*20) diagonal 
matrix of eigenvalues. 
 We can then define Z1=UA and Z2=IB to be the 56*20 and 46*20 vectors of principal 
components (PCs) where each column of matrix Z1 (Z2) is a 56*1 (46*1) vector of 
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observations for one principal component. Each eigenvalue gives the proportion of the total 
variance of each matrix, U and I, explained by the relevant PC. Table 1 gives the four largest 
eigenvalues, the percentage of the variance and the cumulative percentage of the variance of 
matrix U and matrix I explained by the first four principal components and the eigenvectors 
corresponding to each. 
 
Table 1. Principal components and eigenvectors for OECD unemployment and investment 
 
 
The factor loadings for the first PC of unemployment are similar for all countries except the 
United States for which they are smaller. The PC has a very low value until the first world oil 
shock affected unemployment in 1974-75, then another elevation in the early 1980s, the 
recession of the early 1990s, the period of low unemployment in the early 2000s, and then the 
effect of the Great Recession starting in 2008. A similar pattern emerges for the first PC of 
the investment matrix. Plotting the inverse (negative) of the first PC of unemployment against 
Number Value   Proportion Value Proportion Number Value   Proportion Value Proportion
1 13.02 0.65 13.02 0.65 1 10.75 0.54 10.75 0.54
2 2.84 0.14 15.87 0.79 2 2.47 0.12 13.22 0.66
3 1.45 0.07 17.31 0.87 3 1.80 0.09 15.03 0.75
4 0.79 0.04 18.10 0.91 4 1.38 0.07 16.41 0.82
Variable PC 1  PC 2  PC 3  PC 4  Variable PC 1  PC 2  PC 3  PC 4  
Australia 0.25 -0.13 -0.25 0.08 Australia 0.16 0.34 -0.07 -0.16
Austria 0.22 0.26 0.18 0.12 Austria 0.26 -0.15 -0.17 0.18
Belgium 0.26 -0.11 -0.14 0.09 Belgium 0.23 0.16 -0.10 0.41
Canada 0.23 -0.24 -0.14 0.22 Canada 0.16 0.47 -0.04 -0.06
Denmark 0.23 -0.24 0.03 0.17 Denmark 0.24 0.09 0.11 0.13
Finland 0.22 0.22 -0.23 0.13 Finland 0.27 0.11 -0.03 -0.20
France 0.27 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 France 0.27 0.19 -0.09 0.15
Gernabt 0.23 0.21 -0.11 0.30 Germany 0.24 -0.30 -0.23 0.01
Greece 0.17 0.27 0.36 -0.44 Greece 0.27 -0.18 0.07 0.01
Ireland 0.20 -0.32 0.11 -0.33 Ireland 0.14 0.11 0.55 0.20
Italy 0.24 -0.02 -0.16 -0.40 Italy 0.27 -0.02 0.15 -0.07
Japan 0.18 0.36 0.17 0.24 Japan 0.25 -0.29 -0.17 -0.04
Netherlands 0.21 -0.34 0.02 -0.02 Netherlands 0.23 -0.25 -0.17 0.23
Norway 0.23 0.11 -0.26 0.01 Norway 0.23 0.20 -0.18 -0.28
New Zealand 0.25 0.07 -0.16 -0.19 New Zealand 0.18 0.12 0.29 -0.36
Portugal 0.19 0.02 0.54 0.00 Portugal 0.17 -0.34 0.24 -0.03
Spain 0.27 -0.03 0.07 -0.24 Spain 0.16 0.14 0.29 0.49
Sweden 0.20 0.34 0.01 0.10 Sweden 0.26 0.15 -0.21 -0.09
U.K. 0.25 -0.21 0.02 -0.01 U.K. 0.27 -0.10 -0.06 -0.20
U.S. 0.13 -0.29 0.45 0.40 U.S. 0.15 -0.22 0.42 -0.31
Unemployment Investment
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the first PC of investment gives the relationship shown in Figure 1. There is a clear 
relationship between the two series. 
 
 Figure 1. The first PCs of unemployment and investment 
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Figure 1 shows how the rise in world unemployment (fall in the inverse of the first PC of 
unemployment) in the 1970s and early 1980s coincides with a fall in investment as a share of 
GDP. Moreover, the rise of investment in the late 1980s coincides with a rise in employment 
and the recession in the early 1990s has both investment and employment falling, then rising 
in the late 1990s. The Great Recession starting with the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has both 
investment and employment falling suddenly. 
 
3. Panel estimation 
We next test for the stationarity of our panel data using the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and 
the combining p-values Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) panel unit root tests. Both of those tests 
allow for an unbalanced panel. Because the countries in our sample may have similarities, our 
results could be affected by cross-sectional correlation in unemployment or investment rates. 
We control for cross-sectional correlation by removing cross-sectional means. The results 
10 
 
reported in Table A1 indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% 
significance level for investment and at the 5% level for unemployment. 
In Table 2 we estimate a panel equation for the OECD countries reported in Table 1. In 
order to remove the business cycle in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) we use five-year averages 
of our data while in the remaining columns we use decadal averages. First, in order to get 
comparable results with Herbertsson and Zoega (2002) we first restrict our sample to the 
1960-2000 period. Columns (1)-(4) depict the results of an unbalanced panel estimation for 
the 1960-2000 period (starting in 1970 for some countries). We also control for real oil prices 
in columns (2) and (4).5 All equations include country fixed effects in order to capture 
country-specific characteristics. The coefficient on investment is negative and statistically 
significant in all cases while using decadal averages increases its value at a level that is very 
close to the estimates of Herbertsson and Zoega (2002). In column (4) a rise in investment as 
a percentage of GDP by 3% will decrease unemployment by about 2.5%. Note that the 
relationship is stronger (the coefficient larger) when using decadal data. 
In columns (5)-(8) we expand our sample to the 1960-2015 period in order to test whether 
the inclusion of the Great Recession affected the relationship. The coefficient on investment 
remains negative and statistically significant but its value decreases both in the estimations 
using decadal averages (from -0.854 to -0.518) as well as in those using five-year averages 
(from -0.653 to -0.421). A likely explanation for the lower investment coefficient in the 
1960-2015 period is that the financial crisis affected the relationship between investment and 
unemployment. If we restrict our sample only to the EU countries, we observe a similar 
decrease in the value of the investment coefficient when we include the period of the Great 
Recession [see columns (1) to (8) in Table A2 in Appendix]. 
                                                          
5 All results are very similar when we take averages over five-year periods. 
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       Table 2. Relationship between unemployment and investment in the OECD, 1960-2015 
 
 1960-2000 1960-2015 
 5 year 5 year Decadal Decadal 5 year 5 year Decadal Decadal 
 averages averages averages averages averages averages averages averages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Investment -0.617*** -0.653*** -0.828*** -0.854*** -0.470*** -0.421*** -0.563*** -0.518*** 
(% gdp) (-3.64) (-3.78) (-3.08) (-3.02) (-4.11) (-3.56) (-4.10) (-3.04) 
         
Real price   0.319**  0.292  0.169***  0.096 
of oil  (2.47)  (0.99)  (2.56)  (0.75) 
         
N 124 124 64 64 184 184 104 104 
R2 0.502 0.538 0.595 0.610 0.463 0.525 0.551 0.554 
 Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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In order to test directly for the impact of the financial crisis, in Table 3 we include the 
dummy DFC that takes the value 1 for the period 2008-15. DFC is positive and statistically 
significant in both columns implying the expected positive effect of the financial crisis on the 
level of unemployment. Furthermore, when multiplying DFC with investment as a share of 
GDP, we see in column (3) that the financial crisis decreases the coefficient on the 
investment ratio and this effect is statistically insignificant at the 5% level but significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
Table 3. The impact of the financial crisis on the relationship between unemployment and 
investment, 1960-2015 
 
 OECD EU 
 Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Investment -0.148*** -0.159*** -0.167*** -0.158*** -0.172*** -0.179*** 
(% gdp) (-4.03) (-3.97) (-4.07) (-4.35) (-4.56) (-4.50) 
       
       
Investment  0.090** 0.065  0.099** 0.074** 
(% gdp) x 
DFC 
 (2.30) (1.70)  (2.91) (2.66) 
       
DFC 0.239*** 0.999** 0.659* 0.271*** 1.087*** 0.708** 
 (3.48) (2.84) (1.83) (3.35) (3.21) (2.44) 
       
Real price    0.136*   0.168* 
of Oil   (2.08)   (2.06) 
       
       
N 933 933 906 933 104 104 
R2 0.372 0.377 0.385 0.357 0.551 0.554 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at 
country level in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
 
In the last three columns of Table 3 we restrict our sample to the EU countries, where the 
crisis was more prolonged compared to the rest of the OECD countries and coupled with the 
euro debt crisis. Comparing columns (3) and (6), we observe that restricting our attention to 
the EU countries increases the level of statistical significance of the crisis dummy from the 
10% to the 5% significance level, implying that the crisis may have had a more significant 
positive impact on unemployment in the EU than in the rest of the OECD countries. 
Moreover, in column (6) where DFC is multiplied with investment as a share of GDP, we see 
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that the financial crisis has a statistically significant negative effect on the coefficient of the 
investment ratio. However, the overall effect of investment on unemployment still remains 
negative and statistically significant.  
We have found that the effect of the Great Recession was greater on unemployment than 
investment. Unemployment increases by more than the fall in investment would lead us to 
predict based on the years prior to the crisis. In terms of the models of the effect of 
uncertainty on investment, this would imply that the decision to hire a new worker is less 
reversible than the decision to invest in new capital equipment. Thus investment in workers 
would be less redeployable using the terminology of Kim and Kung (2016) as discussed in 
Section 1.2. 
In Table 4 we add the current account surplus for the crisis years following Bertola 
(2017). In column (1) we include investment and the current account as regressors and find 
that investment retains its significance and the estimated coefficient value is very similar to 
that in column (5) of Table 2. In contrast, the current account variable is not statistically 
significant from zero although with the expected sign – a more positive current account 
makes the rate of unemployment go up. In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the regressions 
using decadal averages, which reduces the number of observations. In this case the 
coefficient of the current account variable becomes even less significant while the absolute 
size of the investment variable increases as in Table 2.6 In columns (5) and (6) we include the 
financial crisis dummy and interact it with both the investment variable and the current 
account variable. The dummy variable has a positive effect on unemployment and reduces the 
value of the negative coefficient of investment as well as the positive effect of the current 
account surplus on unemployment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Results remain very similar if we reduce our sample to the EU countries as can be seen in columns (9) - (12) of 
Table A2. 
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Table 4. Relationship between unemployment, investment and the current account, 1960-
2015 
 
We can conclude that it may be through investment that the positive relationship between 
current account surpluses and unemployment, discovered by Bertola (2017), works. This is in 
accordance with Bertola’s (2017) model. As a consequence, by including investment 
alongside the current account variable, the significance of the latter is much reduced 
compared to the results of Bertola (2017). A very likely reason for this is that a negative 
current account balance, which implies a capital inflow, generates an investment boom which 
then decreases unemployment through that channel.  
 
  
  
 Annual Annual Decadal Decadal Annual Annual 
   averages averages   
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Investment -0.170*** -0.160*** -0.562*** -0.517*** -0.151*** -0.156*** 
(% gdp) (-4.54) (-3.93) (-3.79) (-2.87) (-3.89) (-3.90) 
       
Current account 0.018 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.024 
(% gdp) (1.39) (1.50) (0.03) (0.02) (1.39) (1.59) 
       
Real price   0.186***  0.096  0.168** 
Oil  (4.02)  (0.75)  (2.32) 
          
Investment     0.084** 0.058 
(% gdp)* 
DFC 
    (2.19) (1.57) 
       
Current account     -0.018 -0.021* 
(% gdp)* 
DFC 
    (-1.55) (-1.91) 
       
DFC     0.940** 0.555 
     (2.69) (1.56) 
N 933 906 104 104 933 906 
R2 0.365 0.390 0.551 0.554 0.384 0.395 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at 
country level in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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Table 5. Labour Market Institutions and the relationship between unemployment, investment and the current account, 1960-2015 
 1960-2000 1960-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Investment -0.655*** -0.727*** -0.518** -0.674*** -0.712*** -0.510** -0.461*** -0.413*** -0.330*** -0.449*** -0.393*** -0.294** 
(% gdp) (-3.49) (-3.98) (-2.87) (-3.38) (-3.76) (-2.82) (-3.76) (-3.31) (-3.19) (-3.49) (-2.99) (-2.79) 
             
Current account     -0.019 0.019 0.013    0.008 0.012 0.021* 
(% gdp)    (-0.68) (0.69) (0.56)    (0.63) (0.96) (1.88) 
             
Real price oil  0.407*** 0.561***  0.437*** 0.585***  0.184** 0.215*** 0.184** 0.192*** 0.229*** 
  (3.94) (3.35)  (3.87) (3.20)  (2.82) (3.33) (2.82) (2.91) (3.54) 
             
Union density  0.045*** -0.017  0.044*** -0.018  0.026*** -0.001  0.025*** -0.001 
  (4.98) (-0.79)  (4.74) (-0.81)  (4.50) (-0.05)  (3.92) (-0.09) 
             
Tax wedge  0.003 0.037  -0.000 0.038  0.006** 0.042**  0.003 0.044** 
  (0.90) (1.14)  (-0.05) (1.15)  (2.51) (2.22)  (1.15) (2.39) 
             
UI replacement  0.032*** 0.024**  0.033*** 0.024*  0.019*** 0.015*  0.018*** 0.015* 
rate  (4.28) (2.16)  (4.35) (2.08)  (3.87) (1.98)  (3.60) (2.00) 
             
Empl. protection  0.012*** -0.296**  0.016** -0.289**  0.021*** 0.026  0.024*** 0.052 
  (11.99) (-2.39)  (2.62) (-2.27)  (58.41) (0.23)  (9.13) (0.48) 
             
Coordination  -0.824*** -0.133  -0.802*** -0.131  -0.483*** -0.297*  -0.457*** -0.337* 
  (-7.16) (-0.48)  (-6.28) (-0.47)  (-7.09) (-1.74)  (-5.72) (-1.88) 
             
Union Coverage  1.486*** 1.344***  1.440*** 1.345***  0.822*** 0.762***  0.771*** 0.721*** 
  (4.43) (3.35)  (4.02) (3.34)  (3.73) (4.30)  (3.21) (4.09) 
             
Active labour   -0.030*** -0.003  -0.030*** -0.003  -0.022*** -0.007  -0.022*** -0.008* 
market policy  (-7.33) (-0.43)  (-7.70) (-0.53)  (-7.56) (-1.47)  (-7.53) (-1.74) 
             
             
             
N 117 117 117 117 117 117 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R2 0.520 0.471 0.538 0.575 0.577 0.659 0.471 0.489 0.561 0.472 0.491 0.567 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Time invariant institution data of Blanchard and Wolfers (BW, 2000) in columns (2), (5), (8) and (11). Time variant data for Union Density, Tax wedge, UI replacement rate 
and Employment Protection  from Bertola (2017) in columns (3), (6), (9) and (12). While in BW and Bertola (2017) the signs of Coordination  and Active labour market 
policy have been adjusted so that they have a positive impact on unemployment, we keep the signs of all institution variables  positive.
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Finally, we want to test if our results will be affected by controlling for institutions in 
line with the large literature that emphasises the prominent role of their heterogeneity across 
countries on the nature and the level of unemployment [see Nickell, et al. (2005), Phelps 
(1994), Fitoussi, et al. (2000) and Blanchard and Wolfers (BW, 2000)].  In all columns of 
Table 5 we use five-year averages and Greece is excluded due to the unavailability of data for 
institutions. Nevertheless, comparing column (1) of Table 5 with column (1) of Table 2 we 
conclude that excluding institutions does not affect the impact of the investment ratio on 
unemployment for the 1960-2000 period.  Column (2) of Table 5 controls for institutions 
using time invariant variables from the data set of BW that builds on the Institutions Data Set 
of Nickell (2006) for OECD countries in the 1960-2004 period.  We see that controlling for 
the heterogeneity of institutions across countries does not affect significantly the impact of 
the investment ratio on unemployment.   
BW revised the institution data set by introducing time variability for some institution 
variables while Bertola (2017) extended the BW dataset up to 2015 and used time-varying 
series for labour tax wedge, employment protection legislation, union density and 
unemployment insurance replacement rates. In column 3 of Table 5 we use the above 
institutions from the Bertola (2017) data set together with the time invariant variables of BW 
for coordination, union coverage and active labour market policy. Introducing time 
variability of some institutions decreases the coefficient of the investment ratio while union 
density, coordination and active labour market policies become statistically insignificant 
while the impact of employment protection on unemployment becomes negative. The latter 
result may reflect the reforms of labour protection legislation through time. In columns (4)-
(6), we control for the current account and find that, similar to our results in Table 4, the 
coefficient of the current account ratio remains insignificant. In the RHS of Table 5 we 
perform the same regressions after extending our sample to include the crisis years as in 
Table 2.  Columns (7) - (12) confirm our previous result for a decrease in the value of the 
investment ratio coefficient, which remains negative and statistically significant.  The 
coefficient of the current account ratio in columns (10)-(12) is mostly statistically 
insignificant although it becomes statistically significant at the 10-percent level when we 
control for time-variable institutions in column (12).  Regarding the impact of institutions on 
unemployment rate, including the period of Great Recession leads to a statistically significant 
impact of the tax wedge on unemployment while employment protection becomes 
insignificant. 
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Overall, we find that union coverage and the unemployment benefit replacement ratio 
have a positive and significant coefficient in the regressions of Table 5. Another such 
variable is the real price of oil, which captures the elevation of unemployment in the mid-
1970s and early 1980s. However, we note that investment retains a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in all 12 columns and note also that the numerical value of the 
coefficient of investment is similar across columns. Looking at the R-squares we see that not 
much is gained from adding the institutional variables since investment alone explains around 
half the variation in unemployment.  
We will now spell out a model that is compatible with the stylised relationship between 
investment, unemployment, and the current account. 
 
4. A small open economy two-sector model of investment, unemployment and current 
account 
 
While the mechanism linking investment to unemployment in the medium run is present in a 
range of models with different types of assets such as trained employees and customers, our 
investment data only include physical capital. Thus, the two-sector model is relevant for 
understanding our empirical results. We model increased uncertainty as an increase in the risk 
premium. Our model is related to that in Kanaginis and Phelps (1994) and Phelps (1994). 
Moreover, as we are interested also in exploring the relationship between the variation in 
current account and unemployment movements, we develop here an open economy version 
of the two-sector model. We assume that there is a non-traded sector producing a pure 
consumption good that is also relatively capital intensive. The tradable sector produces a 
good that can be used both for consumption and investment such as in the standard Solow 
(1956) model. This sector is relatively labour intensive. Consumers have homothetic 
preferences and devote a fixed share of their expenditure to each good. We introduce 
endogenous job rationing in general equilibrium by drawing upon an efficiency-wage theory 
of unemployment; in particular, we adopt the effort-elicitation or shirking model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984), extended to allow for worker savings in Brecher, Chen, and Choudhri 
(2010). To obtain an investment demand function, we introduce installation costs to generate 
a Tobin’s q theory of investment. There is perfect international capital mobility, with world 
interest rate exogenously given by 𝑟∗. To capture the effects of policy uncertainty, we 
introduce a risk premium µ that requires that the domestic real interest rate be equal to 𝑟∗+µ. 
We let the tradable good be the numeraire. 
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Figure 2 below shows an upward-sloping wage-setting curve (WS) in the real wage (𝑣) – 
employment (1-u) space that can be derived from efficiency wage theory, as in Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984), and a downward-sloping labour demand curve. In our model, following 
Brecher, et al. (2010), the wage-setting curve can be represented by 
𝑣
𝐸
= 𝜌+𝑎+𝑏
𝑔
+ 1,                                                          (1) 
where 𝑣 is the real wage, 𝐸 is real consumption expenditure, 𝑎 is the job accession rate, 𝑏 is 
the exogenously given job separation rate and 𝑔 is the probability of being caught if 
shirking.7 In turn, assuming that employment adjusts rapidly to equate the outflow from the 
unemployment pool to the inflow into the unemployment pool, we can write, using 𝑎 =
𝑏(1−𝑢)
𝑢
, the wage-setting curve: 
𝑣 = [1 + 𝜌+𝑏
𝑔
+ 𝑏(1−𝑢)
𝑔𝑢
]𝐸.                                           (2) 
To obtain the labour demand curve or the demand-wage curve, we specify the production 
functions and profit-maximising behaviour of firms selling under perfect competition. Using 
the subscript “N” to denote non-tradables and “T” to denote tradables, we have 
𝑣 = 𝑝𝑁[𝑓(𝑘𝑁) − 𝑘𝑁𝑓′(𝑘𝑁)] = 𝑔(𝑘𝑇) − 𝑘𝑇𝑔′(𝑘𝑇),                             (3) 
𝑅 = 𝑝𝑁𝑓′(𝑘𝑁) = 𝑔′(𝑘𝑇),                                                (4) 
where R is the user cost of capital, the output of the non-tradable is given by 𝑍𝑁 = 𝐿𝑁𝑓(𝑘𝑁), 
𝑓(𝑘𝑁) being the output per worker expressed as a concave function of capital per worker in 
the non-tradable sector, and the output of the tradable good is given by 𝑍𝑇 = 𝐿𝑇𝑔(𝑘𝑇),  
𝑔(𝑘𝑇) being the output per worker expressed as a concave function of capital per worker in 
the tradable sector. A key result of the two-sector model is that the real demand wage is a 
monotone decreasing function of the relative price of the non-tradable, 𝑝𝑁 which is the 
relatively capital-intensive good. Moreover, given the relative price of the non-
tradable, 𝑝𝑁 , the user cost of capital, R, is also pinned down. The market-clearing condition 
for the non-tradable sector, in turn, determines the relative price of the non-tradable. Note 
that, given the assumption that the non-tradable good sector is relatively capital intensive, a 
decrease in total domestic capital stock leads to a relatively more expensive non-tradable 
good and thus increases the user cost of capital. An increase in the risk premium due to an 
                                                          
7 The equation is taken from Proposition 2 of Brecher, et al. (2010), where we have specialised to the case where 
exerting effort results in a loss of utility equal to one. 
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increase in policy uncertainty results in a fall in investment, thus a gradual decline in capital 
stock, which leads to a higher relative price of the non-tradable good, 𝑝𝑁. This, in turn, 
increases the user cost of capital and lowers the real demand wage; that is, it shifts the labour 
demand curve to the left as shown in Figure 2. 
 
    Figure 2. Labour market equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, to understand how an increase in policy uncertainty that leads to an increase in risk 
premium contracts investment, we suppose that the total cost of investing in investment of 𝐼 
is equal to 𝐼 + 𝐶(𝐼), where 𝐶′(𝐼) > 0 and 𝐶′′(𝐼) > 0. Solving the optimisation of price-
taking firms under perfect competition gives rise to  
𝐶′(𝐼) = 𝑞 − 1                                                         (5) 
and 𝐼 =Ф(𝑞 − 1) with Ф′(𝑞 − 1)>0. Here, 𝑞 is the shadow price of capital. The following 
two equations show the dynamic behaviour of the capital stock resulting from the q theory of 
investment: 
?̇? = Ф(𝑞 − 1) − δK,                                                   (6) 
𝑔′(𝑘𝑇) = 𝑞 �𝑟∗ + 𝜇 + 𝛿 − ?̇?𝑞� = 𝑅.                                  (7) 
In Figure 3, we show that an increase in policy uncertainty that leads to a rise in risk premium 
leads to drop in 𝑞, which in turn means a decline in investment demand.  
 
  
WS 
𝐿𝐷 
   
v 
1-u
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Figure 3. Increased uncertainty and the risk premium 
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                                                                                                                     𝐾 
Thus an increase in the risk premium leads to a drop in q, lower investment, a reduction in the 
stock of capital and an increase in the user cost of capital, hence a fall in the real demand 
wage and an increase in the natural rate of unemployment in Figure 2. Increased uncertainty 
generates a higher level of the natural rate of unemployment going through a lower price of 
the labour intensive good, which is the tradable good in our model.8 The same story could be 
told if the world real rate of interest r* increased. Then the relative price of the tradable good 
would fall worldwide resulting in an increase in unemployment in the world. This was the 
theme of the Phelps (1994) book and the subsequent papers by Phelps and Zoega (2001) and 
Fitoussi, et al. (2001). 
What is the effect on current account? In Figure 4, we depict an economy that is initially 
neither a net creditor nor debtor with current account balance. We show that an increase in 
the risk premium, which in Figure 2 leads to an increase in equilibrium unemployment, shifts 
the production possibility curve in towards the origin. In Figure 3, this increase in risk 
                                                          
8 It is theoretically possible that a rise in the risk premium leads to such a drastic drop in q that the user cost of 
capital R falls. In this situation, however, the fall in investment and any accompanying current account surplus 
involve a decline in unemployment. This theoretical case does not find empirical support in Bertola (2017) nor 
in our own empirical work reported above. We could say that the theoretical case where a rise in μ leads to a fall 
in q that, overall, still leaves R higher and hence unemployment higher finds empirical support. 
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premium leads to a decrease in investment. While the decline in production of the tradable 
good and increase in consumption of the tradable good (as consumers shift away from 
consuming the non-tradable good as 𝑝𝑁 increases) tend to lead to a current account deficit, a 
sufficiently large drop of investment demand can produce a current account surplus as 
illustrated in Figure 4.9 This provides a theoretical explanation for why a decrease in 
investment is found empirically to accompany a rise in unemployment and a current account 
surplus. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
We find that over a period as long as half a century, a statistically significant negative 
relationship exists between investment and unemployment. The negative relationship 
between investment and unemployment can be regarded as a stylised fact even when the 
years of the financial crisis and the Great Recession are included in the sample as well as 
traditional institutional variables of the labour market. Our empirical analysis shows that the 
Great Recession has a direct positive effect on unemployment and reduces the coefficient of 
investment although the investment coefficient retains its statistical significance at 
conventional levels. Including the current account surplus in the regression does not change 
these results. This variable has a positive but insignificant coefficient when investment is also 
included in the regression. We then develop a small open economy two-sector model that 
provides a theoretical explanation for this relationship and its link with the current account.  
We conclude that the inverse relationship between investment and unemployment 
remains robust even in the long run and that the statistical relationship going from a rise in 
current account surplus to higher unemployment is likely to work through investment so that 
a capital outflow – that is a positive current account surplus – generates lower investment and 
higher unemployment. 
  
                                                          
9 Note that the consumption of the non-tradable good goes up in the figure as it is drawn while the ratio of the 
consumption of the tradable to the non-tradable good has to increase due to the fall in the relative price of the 
tradable good. Thus the level of consumption of both goods can increase. However, if the production possibility 
frontier were to shift sufficiently further inwards the consumption of the non-tradable good would fall. 
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Figure 4. Effect of an increase in policy uncertainty that leads to increased risk premium                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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Note: PP is the old price line with slope given by 𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑜 , P’P’ is the new price line with slope given by 𝑃𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛, 
𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the new current account surplus, 𝐶𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜  and 𝐶𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑛 are old and new consumption of tradable good, 
respectively, 𝐶𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑜  and 𝐶𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛 are old and new consumption of non-tradable good, respectively, 𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛 are 
old and new investment demand for tradable good, respectively.                                                                                   
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Appendix 
Data appendix 
Data for the unemployment rate, investment (% gdp) and current account (% gdp) are from 
the OECD (https://data.oecd.org). Real price oil is the ratio of the price of crude oil in the 
U.S. to the consumer-price index for that country from U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. Data on institutions were kindly provided by Giuseppe Bertola. Coordination 
and Active Labour Market Policies are the series of the Blanchard and Wolfers (2000, 
henceforth BW) data set extended to 2014. Time variant data for the tax wedge and UI 
replacement rate are imputed using BW and OECD data.  Time variant union density comes 
from the OECD from 1960 to 2014 for most countries. Employment protection is the BW 
employment protection time varying variable from 1960 to 1995 and recent predictors are 
from the OECD Version 1 (1985-2013) indicators of regular and temporary employment 
protection. For full details, see Bertola (2017). 
 
Table A1. Unit root tests 
 Im-Pesaran-Shin test Fisher-type unit root test 
 W-t-bar Inverse chi-sq. 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse 
logit 
Modified inv. 
chi-sq. 
Unemployment 
 
Statistic 1.7879 149.2806 -8.4152 -9.0713 12.2179 
p-value 0.0369 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lags 1.60 2 2 2 2 
No of 
periods 55.80 55.80 55.80 55.80 55.80 
Investment 
 
Statistic -23.1455 344.7425 -15.6250 -21.3395 34.0712 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lags 0.80 2 2 2 2 
No of 
periods 48.85 48.85 48.85 48.85 48.85 
Investment (%gdp) 
 
Statistic -12.7453 253.8645 -12.3322 -15.6879 23.9108 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lags 3.20 2 2 2 2 
No of 
periods 46.85 46.85 46.85 46.85 46.85 
Notes: For the IPS test, the number of lags are chosen so that the AIC for the regression is 
minimised. The number of panels is 20 for all cases. 
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Table A2. Relationship between unemployment and investment in the EU, 1960-2015 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses.  * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 1960-2000  1960-2015 
 5 year 5 year Decadal Decadal 5 year 5 year Decadal Decadal 5 year 5 year Decadal Decadal 
   averages   averages averages averages   averages   averages averages averages   averages   averages averages averages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   (10)   (11)   (12) 
Investment -0.617*** -0.653*** -0.766*** -0.777** -0.487*** -0.429*** -0.614*** -0.543*** -0.503*** -0.437*** -0.637*** -0.566*** 
(% gdp) (-5.30) (-5.76) (-3.23) (-2.98) (-4.86) (-4.19) (-5.06) (-3.45) (-4.67) (-3.78) (-4.92) (-3.40) 
             
Current           -0.008 -0.004 -0.010 -0.009 
account          (-0.51) (-0.24) (-0.75) (-0.72) 
(% gdp)             
             
Real price   0.319***  0.295  0.188***  0.143  0.185**  0.142 
Oil  (2.81)  (0.89)  (2.42)  (1.06)  (2.34)  (1.03) 
             
             
N 124 124 49 49 139 139 79 79 139 139 79 79 
R2 0.502 0.538 0.590 0.609 0.476 0.496 0.592 0.599 0.477 0.496 0.594 0.601 
